What You'll Learn
- Classify phishing attacks into the major categories: credential harvesting, malware delivery, BEC, and spear phishing
- Identify URL manipulation techniques including typosquatting, homoglyph attacks, URL shorteners, and punycode encoding
- Recognize the social engineering tactics attackers use to bypass rational decision-making: urgency, authority, scarcity, and fear
- Differentiate between spray phishing (high volume, low effort) and spear phishing (targeted, researched)
- Analyze real-world phishing campaign patterns and extract indicators of compromise
- Apply phishing classification skills to triage reported emails efficiently in a SOC environment
- Explain how smishing and vishing extend phishing beyond email
Beyond "Don't Click the Link"
Every security awareness training says the same thing: "Don't click suspicious links. Don't open unexpected attachments." And every year, phishing remains the number one initial access vector. The reason is simple — phishing works not because users are careless, but because attackers are skilled at exploiting human psychology under time pressure.
As a SOC analyst, your job is not to blame the user who clicked. Your job is to classify the phishing attack, contain the damage, and extract indicators that protect the rest of the organization. To do that, you need a taxonomy — a structured way to categorize what you are looking at.
Credential Harvesting: The Fake Login Page
Credential harvesting is the most common phishing objective. The attacker's goal is to trick the user into entering their username and password on a fake login page that mimics a legitimate service.
How It Works
- Attacker creates a clone of a login page (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, banking portal)
- Hosts the clone on attacker-controlled infrastructure
- Sends an email with a pretext that motivates the user to click (expired password, shared document, account suspension)
- User enters credentials on the fake page
- Credentials are captured and sent to the attacker
- User is redirected to the real login page (so they think the first attempt "failed" and log in normally)
What Makes It Effective
The redirect in step 6 is critical. The user experiences one "failed" login attempt — which happens to everyone — and then successfully logs in on the second attempt (the real site). They have no reason to suspect anything happened. Meanwhile, the attacker has valid credentials.
Credential harvesting with MFA bypass is now standard. Modern phishing kits (EvilGinx2, Modlishka, Muraena) act as reverse proxies between the user and the real login page. The user enters credentials AND completes MFA on the real site — through the attacker's proxy. The attacker captures the authenticated session token. MFA does not stop this attack.
SOC Indicators
| Indicator | Where to Check |
|---|---|
| URL does not match legitimate service domain | URL bar analysis, email body links |
| Recently registered domain | WHOIS lookup |
| Free hosting / URL shortener | URL analysis |
| SSL certificate from Let's Encrypt on a "corporate" login page | Certificate details |
| Login page requests more information than usual | Page behavior analysis |
| Immediate redirect after credential submission | Network traffic (if available) |
Malware Delivery: Weaponized Attachments
The second major phishing category aims to execute malicious code on the victim's machine. The payload can be delivered through attachments or through links that trigger downloads.
Common Delivery Mechanisms
| Mechanism | Description | File Types |
|---|---|---|
| Macro-enabled documents | Word/Excel files with VBA macros that execute on "Enable Content" | .docm, .xlsm, .pptm |
| Password-protected archives | ZIP/RAR with password in the email body — bypasses scanning | .zip, .rar, .7z |
| ISO/IMG disk images | Mount as virtual drives, bypass Mark-of-the-Web | .iso, .img, .vhd |
| HTML smuggling | HTML attachment constructs and downloads a payload client-side via JavaScript | .html, .htm |
| LNK shortcut files | Windows shortcuts that execute PowerShell or cmd commands | .lnk |
| OneNote files | Embedded scripts in OneNote pages (emerged 2023 after macro blocking) | .one |
HTML Smuggling Deep Dive
HTML smuggling deserves special attention because it bypasses most email gateways. The attachment is a plain HTML file — which email filters rarely block. When opened in a browser, embedded JavaScript assembles a malicious payload from Base64-encoded data and triggers a download. The payload never crosses the email gateway as a binary — it is constructed locally on the victim's machine.
<!-- Simplified HTML smuggling concept -->
<script>
var payload = atob("TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAAAA...");
var blob = new Blob([payload], {type: "application/octet-stream"});
var link = document.createElement("a");
link.href = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
link.download = "Invoice_Feb2026.exe";
link.click();
</script>
Microsoft disabled macros by default in Office 2022+, and Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) now blocks execution of downloaded files from untrusted sources. Attackers responded by shifting to ISO/IMG disk images (which bypass MOTW), HTML smuggling, and OneNote files. The delivery mechanisms evolve constantly — the principle remains the same: trick the user into running attacker code.
BEC: Business Email Compromise
BEC attacks do not use malware or fake login pages. Instead, they rely purely on social engineering to trick employees into performing an action — usually transferring money or sharing sensitive data.
BEC Subtypes
| Subtype | Description | Target |
|---|---|---|
| CEO Fraud | Attacker impersonates the CEO and requests an urgent wire transfer | CFO, Finance team |
| Invoice Redirect | Attacker poses as a vendor and sends updated banking details for an existing invoice | Accounts Payable |
| Payroll Diversion | Attacker impersonates an employee and requests their direct deposit details be changed | HR, Payroll |
| Attorney Impersonation | Attacker poses as outside counsel handling a confidential acquisition | Executive team |
| Data Theft | Attacker requests W-2s, employee lists, or customer data under a pretext | HR, IT, Admin |
Why BEC Is Uniquely Dangerous
BEC accounts for the highest dollar losses of any cybercrime category. The FBI IC3 reported $2.9 billion in BEC losses in 2023 — more than ransomware, more than data breaches. The reason:
- No technical indicators: No malware, no malicious URLs, no attachments. The email is pure text.
- Passes authentication: If the attacker compromises a real mailbox, SPF/DKIM/DMARC all pass.
- Exploits business processes: The request (wire transfer, invoice payment) is a normal business activity.
- Urgency and authority: "I need this done before the board meeting at 3pm. Keep this confidential."
BEC is often missed by automated tools. Email gateways scan for malware, malicious URLs, and authentication failures. A BEC email has none of these. Detection relies on behavioral analysis (unusual sender patterns, anomalous requests) and user awareness. As a SOC analyst, BEC reports often come from users who "felt something was off" — take those reports seriously.
Spear Phishing vs Spray Phishing
Not all phishing is created equal. The effort level and targeting determine how the attack should be classified and how urgently you should respond.
Spray Phishing (Commodity)
| Characteristic | Description |
|---|---|
| Volume | Thousands to millions of emails |
| Targeting | None — random or purchased email lists |
| Personalization | None — generic greeting ("Dear Customer") |
| Pretext | Generic (package delivery, invoice, account suspension) |
| Infrastructure | Cheap: free hosting, bulk mailers, disposable domains |
| Success rate | Low (0.1-1%) but volume compensates |
| SOC response | Block indicators, update filters, close ticket |
Spear Phishing (Targeted)
| Characteristic | Description |
|---|---|
| Volume | One to dozens of emails |
| Targeting | Specific individuals researched via LinkedIn, company website, social media |
| Personalization | Uses the target's name, role, recent projects, colleagues' names |
| Pretext | Tailored (references real business context, ongoing projects, recent events) |
| Infrastructure | Sophisticated: look-alike domains, valid SSL, clean IP reputation |
| Success rate | High (10-50%) due to personalization |
| SOC response | Investigate fully — this may indicate targeted campaign against your organization |
Spear phishing demands a different response level. If you determine a reported phishing email is targeted (uses the recipient's name, references their role or projects, comes from a look-alike domain registered recently), escalate immediately. Targeted phishing often precedes a broader campaign against your organization — you may be seeing the reconnaissance phase of a larger attack.
Smishing and Vishing: Beyond Email
Phishing is not limited to email. Two extensions are increasingly common in SOC reporting:
Smishing (SMS Phishing): Malicious text messages with shortened URLs. Common pretexts include package delivery notifications, bank account alerts, and MFA verification codes. Smishing exploits the trust users place in SMS (higher open rate than email) and the difficulty of inspecting URLs on mobile devices.
Vishing (Voice Phishing): Phone calls impersonating IT support, bank representatives, or government agencies. Attackers use caller ID spoofing to display legitimate numbers. Vishing is often combined with email phishing — an email creates urgency, then the attacker calls to "help" the victim resolve the issue.
URL Analysis Techniques
URL analysis is the most immediately actionable phishing analysis skill. Every credential harvester and many malware delivery emails include a URL. Here is your systematic approach.
Typosquatting
The attacker registers a domain visually similar to a legitimate one by introducing subtle character changes:
| Legitimate Domain | Typosquatted Domain | Technique |
|---|---|---|
microsoft.com | microsft.com | Missing letter |
paypal.com | paypa1.com | Letter/number substitution |
google.com | gooogle.com | Extra letter |
amazon.com | amaz0n-support.com | Substitution + extra words |
company.com | company-login.com | Subdomain/word addition |
Homoglyph Attacks
Homoglyphs are characters from different alphabets that look identical to Latin characters:
| Character | Looks Like | Actual Unicode |
|---|---|---|
| Cyrillic а | Latin a | U+0430 |
| Cyrillic о | Latin o | U+043E |
| Cyrillic е | Latin e | U+0435 |
| Cyrillic р | Latin p | U+0440 |
аpple.com (first character is Cyrillic а) looks identical to apple.com in most fonts but resolves to a completely different domain. Browsers have implemented IDN (Internationalized Domain Name) protections, but they are not universal.
Punycode Encoding
Internationalized domain names are encoded in ASCII using punycode (prefix xn--). An attacker can register a domain that displays as a familiar name but has a different punycode representation:
Display: аpple.com (Cyrillic а)
Punycode: xn--pple-43d.com
Always check the actual URL, not the display text. In HTML emails, the visible text can say "https://www.microsoft.com/login" while the actual href points to "https://login-microsft.attacker.xyz/harvest". Hover over links to see the true destination. In reported emails, extract and defang all URLs for analysis: hxxps://evil[.]com/path.
URL Shorteners
Services like bit.ly, tinyurl.com, and t.co obscure the true destination URL. Attackers use them to hide obviously malicious domains. Analysts can expand shortened URLs safely using:
curl -sI "https://bit.ly/abc123" | grep -i location
Or use online expansion tools like checkshorturl.com or unshorten.it (in a sandboxed browser).
URL Path and Parameter Tricks
Even when the domain looks legitimate, inspect the full URL:
https://login.legitimate-service.com.evil.com/auth
https://evil.com/https://www.microsoft.com/login
https://evil.com/page?redirect=https://real-site.com
The first example uses a subdomain trick — login.legitimate-service.com looks trustworthy, but the actual domain is evil.com. The second embeds a legitimate URL in the path for visual deception. The third uses a redirect parameter to show a legitimate URL in the page after credential capture.
Social Engineering Tactics
Every phishing email — whether spray or spear, credential harvest or BEC — relies on social engineering principles to override the recipient's rational judgment. Recognizing these tactics is essential for classification.
The Six Influence Principles in Phishing
| Principle | Phishing Application | Example Language |
|---|---|---|
| Urgency | Forces immediate action before the target thinks critically | "Your account will be suspended in 2 hours" |
| Authority | Impersonates power figures to bypass questioning | "This is from the CEO. Do not discuss with anyone." |
| Scarcity | Creates fear of missing out or losing something valuable | "Only 3 seats remaining for the security training" |
| Fear | Triggers threat response that overrides caution | "Unauthorized access detected on your account" |
| Social Proof | Suggests others have already complied | "Your colleagues have already completed this verification" |
| Reciprocity | Offers something to create obligation | "Here is the report you requested" (unsolicited attachment) |
Urgency + Authority is the most dangerous combination. When an email appears to come from the CEO (authority) and demands immediate action on a confidential matter (urgency + scarcity of information), even security-aware employees may comply. This combination is the foundation of nearly every BEC attack.
Language Red Flags
Watch for these patterns in reported phishing emails:
- Threatening consequences: "Failure to verify will result in permanent account closure"
- Artificial time pressure: "You have 24 hours to respond"
- Confidentiality requests: "Do not discuss this with anyone"
- Unusual requests: First-time requests for wire transfers, gift cards, or credential verification
- Mismatched tone: Overly formal language from someone who normally communicates casually, or vice versa
- Grammar and formatting inconsistencies: Not always present in sophisticated attacks, but common in commodity phishing
Real-World Phishing Campaign Case Studies
Case 1: The Microsoft 365 Credential Harvester
Campaign characteristics:
- Subject: "Action Required: Password Expires in 24 Hours"
- Sender:
no-reply@microsoft-365-security.com(look-alike domain, registered 2 days prior) - URL:
hxxps://login.microsoftonline.com.password-update[.]xyz/auth - Tactic: Urgency (24-hour deadline) + Authority (Microsoft branding)
- Outcome: 12 employees entered credentials; attacker used them within 4 hours for mailbox access and internal BEC
SOC indicators: Recently registered domain (WHOIS), URL subdomain trick (.com.password-update.xyz), SPF/DKIM/DMARC all pass (attacker controls the sending domain), authentication-results for the look-alike domain — not microsoft.com.
Case 2: HTML Smuggling Malware Delivery
Campaign characteristics:
- Subject: "Signed Contract — DocuSign"
- Attachment:
Contract_Feb2026.html(23 KB) - The HTML file, when opened, assembled a .iso file from embedded Base64 and triggered download
- Inside the .iso: a .lnk file that executed PowerShell to download Cobalt Strike beacon
- Tactic: Authority (DocuSign branding) + Reciprocity ("signed contract you requested")
SOC indicators: HTML attachment (unusual for DocuSign — real DocuSign sends links), no malicious URLs in the email body (payload is in the attachment), sandbox analysis required to identify behavior.
Case 3: BEC Invoice Redirect
Campaign characteristics:
- Attacker compromised a vendor's real email account
- Sent email to Accounts Payable: "We've changed our banking details. Please update for next month's payment."
- Attached a PDF invoice with new (attacker-controlled) bank account details
- SPF/DKIM/DMARC all passed (sent from the real compromised account)
- No malware, no malicious URLs, no technical indicators
SOC indicators: None in email analysis alone. Detection required out-of-band verification (calling the vendor on a known phone number). Process controls (requiring verbal confirmation for banking changes) are the primary defense.
Building Your Phishing Classification Framework
When a phishing email is reported to the SOC, classify it systematically:
- Objective: What is the attacker trying to achieve? (Credentials, malware execution, money transfer, data)
- Targeting: Is this spray (generic) or spear (personalized to the recipient)?
- Delivery mechanism: URL, attachment, pure social engineering, or hybrid?
- Social engineering tactic: Which influence principles are being exploited?
- Technical sophistication: Commodity kit (low) vs custom infrastructure (high)?
- Authentication status: Did SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass or fail? (From Lesson PH-2)
- Scope: Is this a single report or are multiple employees receiving the same campaign?
This classification drives your response: commodity spray phishing gets IOC extraction and filter updates; targeted spear phishing gets full investigation and potential threat hunt.
Key Takeaways
- Phishing breaks into four major categories: credential harvesting, malware delivery, BEC, and spear phishing — each requiring different analysis and response approaches
- Credential harvester kits now bypass MFA using reverse-proxy techniques (EvilGinx2) — stolen session tokens, not just passwords
- BEC produces the highest financial losses of any cybercrime category and has zero technical indicators — detection depends on behavioral analysis and process controls
- Spear phishing requires immediate escalation because targeting indicates reconnaissance against your organization
- URL analysis covers five manipulation techniques: typosquatting, homoglyphs, punycode, URL shorteners, and path/parameter tricks
- Social engineering exploits urgency, authority, scarcity, fear, social proof, and reciprocity — urgency + authority is the most dangerous combination
- Always classify phishing by objective, targeting level, delivery mechanism, social engineering tactic, and technical sophistication
What's Next
You now have a complete phishing taxonomy and the URL analysis skills to dissect suspicious links. In Lab 4.3, you will apply everything from this module — header analysis (Lesson PH-1), authentication verification (Lesson PH-2), and phishing classification (this lesson) — to triage a set of real-world phishing samples. You will classify each email by type, extract IOCs, determine the attacker's objective, and recommend response actions. This is exactly what you will do in a production SOC when the phishing report queue fills up on a Monday morning.
Knowledge Check: Phishing Types, Tactics & Techniques
10 questions · 70% to pass
What makes credential harvesting with reverse-proxy tools like EvilGinx2 different from traditional credential phishing?
Why does HTML smuggling effectively bypass most email security gateways?
A BEC email from a compromised vendor account requests updated banking details for an existing invoice. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC all pass. What is the primary detection method for this attack?
In Lab 4.3, you encounter a phishing email addressed to a specific employee by name, referencing their recent conference presentation and a project they lead. The email is from a look-alike domain registered 3 days ago. How should you classify this, and what is the appropriate response?
What URL manipulation technique is being used in: hxxps://login.microsoftonline.com.password-reset[.]xyz/auth?
Which social engineering principle combination is considered the most dangerous in phishing, and why?
An employee reports receiving a text message (SMS) claiming to be from the company IT department, asking them to click a link to 're-verify their VPN credentials.' What type of attack is this, and what additional concern does the SMS channel introduce?
In Lab 4.3, you analyze a phishing email with a .docm attachment. Microsoft has disabled macros by default since Office 2022. Why might this attack still succeed?
You receive three phishing reports in one hour from different employees. All three emails have the same subject line, same sender domain, and link to the same credential harvesting page, but none are personalized. How should you classify and respond to this?
In Lab 4.3, you need to safely analyze a suspicious URL from a reported phishing email. Which approach minimizes risk while providing useful intelligence?
0/10 answered